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Abstract: This study focuses on: (1) finding the causes of inflation which follows the inflation theories 
such as Demand-Pull, Cost-Push and Structural inflation.(2) measuring the degree of in-
flation persistence in order to evaluate the ability of monetary policies to control inflation. 
Engle- Granger test and the Autoregressive Distributed Lag are applied to analyze the 
response of inflation to its determinants. The Grid bootstrap Method and Impulse Response 
Functions measure the inflation persistence. The results suggest that controlling the money 
supply is a key factor in controlling inflation. The appreciation of Rial exchange rate is 
an important factor of low inflation. It is increased as a result of Budget deficit while de-
creased due to oil price and real GDP. Inflation persistence follows the structural changes 
and finally permanent shocks die out after some horizons. Therefore, monetary authorities 
control inflation but their policies are yet far from optimal level.
Keywords: inflation; inflation theories; inflation persistence
JEL Classification: E3, E6
Introduction
Inflation is one of the biggest challenges for governments and policy makers since 
World War I and II because of its large adverse effects on economy and people in 
particular; It increases poverty and crime rates. There is consensus among scholars 
and policy makers about the cost of inflation which includes economic costs, social 
unrest and income inequalities. However, a large disagreement exists among them 
about causes and controlling policies of inflation. Every school of thought has its own 
explanation about the reasons of the phenomenon. Inflation theories have developed 
the causes of inflation in parallel with the new events and economic crises. German’s 
inflation of 1922-1923 (after World War I) for instance, is a classic example of de-
mand-pull inflation caused by the increase in the money supply.
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After World War I and II, the high inflation also surfaced in the 1958-recession 
in Western countries. In this particular crisis, aggregate demand had fallen. Hence, 
the general price index should have reduced but it really did not. The consumer price 
index (CPI) actually proceeds to increase, with a high rate of unemployment. An 
attempt to find the reason of this particular phenomenon, mainly for the 1958-puzzle, 
has contributed to the emergence of supply-side theories of inflation, commonly well-
known as cost-push theory and supply-shock theory of inflation.
Also in the 1970s, a great number of nations experienced the high levels of both 
inflation and unemployment referred to as stagflation. Theories based on the Phil-
lips curve advocated that this cannot occur; so it came under criticism by several 
economists. In 1977, Nobel Prize was awarded to  Friedman (1977) for his criticism 
of the Phillips curve (Buchanan et al., 2013). Stagflation happened because most of 
the oil-importing countries were confronted suddenly with an increase in oil prices 
during Arab-Israel War. The surge of oil price had shifted supply curve to left and 
then inflation elevated (Branson, 1979). This occurrence was supported as another 
type of cost-push inflation; as being prominent as the supply-shock inflation (Dwive-
di, 2010).
Inflation in industrial countries is mostly supported by demand-pull and cost-push 
inflation theories but these theories do not completely cover the reasons of inflation in 
developing countries (Jung & Marshall, 1986). For this reason, the structural inflation 
theory has provided the basic understanding of the original causes of inflation in the 
economic structure. Some studies address the fiscal constraints of government and 
the foreign exchange limits as most significant structural causes of inflation in devel-
oping countries. Their problems refer to inappropriate tax and subsidy systems and 
also limited and insufficient capital markets. These limitations drive governments 
to finance deficits through other ways particularly money creation, thereby the mon-
etary authority’s control over inflation is limited. (Ghatak & Sánchez-Fung, 1995; 
Kirkpatrick & Nixson, 1987; Tanzi, 1978).
In 1981, Sargent and Wallace illustrated the fiscal dominance phenomenon as new 
causes of inflation particularly in developing countries. They state that in a monetar-
ist economy, the monetary authority independently determines seigniorage and can 
control inflation. But the monetary authority’s control over inflation is limited when 
the fiscal authority dominates the monetary authority. It depicts that government ap-
plies a simple way to finance its debts by forcing the central bank to print money.
Generally, most of the empirical studies have applied the monetary model to study 
inflation. A famous monetary model is provided by Harberger(1963) and applied to 
clarify Chilean inflation. Moreover it has been applied to Asian countries by Sadeghi, 
Samsami, & Sherafat(2007),Tavakkoli & Karimi (1999), Sheehey (1979) and Saini 
(1982).
After the oil crisis in 1973, some studies augment the monetary inflation model 
with adding cost push inflation factors such as price of oil and exchange rate and im-
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ported goods (Bahmani-Oskooee,1995; Bairam (1990); Cuñado and Pérez de Gracia, 
2003;Darrat; Arize, 1990).
Many studies in developing countries have contributed the structural models to 
clarify the reasons of inflation. They explain the relationship between macroeco-
nomic variables and inflation.Ghatak & Sánchez-Fung (1995),Baer (1987),Jung & 
Marshall (1986),Sargent and Wallace (1981)Prebisch (1970) and Sunkel (1960)are ex-
amples of studies that have used the structuralist model of inflation.
In the last decade, apart from the study of the causes of inflation, some studies 
such as Noriega and Ramos-Francia (2009) and Caporin and Gupta (2017) focus 
on the analyses of the inflation persistence especially in the USA. They state the 
persistence of inflation is crucial to the mechanism of monetary transmission, and 
determines its success in keeping a stable level of economic growth and inflation, 
simultaneously. It also makes up an imperative component in the formulation of an 
optimal and beneficial monetary policy. From the other point of view, discovering 
whether the inflation persistence has dropped is critical in determining the probabili-
ty of recidivism via the monetary authority (Sargent, 2001, Gadea & Mayoral, 2005). 
Iran has encountered the problem of rising inflation. Figure 1 illustrates an aver-
age inflation in Iran at 19.3% compared with low and high income, and Middle East 
countries which worth 8.8%, 3.6%, 7.34% respectively from 1981 to 2011 (World 
Bank, 2012). In 1995, Iran’s inflation reached its highest rate at almost 50% partly. 
Figure 1: Inflation in 1981-2011
Source: World Bank (2012)
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The statistical data show that the government has not achieved its goals to control or 
reduce the money supply growth throughout five years development plans since 
1988.Incorrectly, government has increased its expenditures continuously although it receives 
more income from oil sector for many years. Subsequently it finances its budget deficits by 
forcing the central bank (Bonato, 2007). 
Moreover, Figure 2 displays the Phillips curve in Iran since Iranian revolution in 1979 
to 2011.The result indicates that the 1% increase in real GDP decreases inflation 0.67%. The 
negative impact of real GDP on inflation is confirmed by estimation although R-square is low 
(20%). It means that a decrease in real GDP augments inflation (stagflation). The result 
conflicts with our expectation from the Phillips curve; hence it shows the Iran’s inflation is 
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The statistical data show that the government has not achieved its goals to control 
or reduce the money supply growth throughout five years development plans since 
1988.Incorrectly, government has increased its expenditures continuously although 
it receives more income from oil sector for many years. Subsequently it finances its 
budget deficits by forcing the central bank (Bonato, 2007).
Moreover, Figure 2 displays the Phillips curve in Iran since Iranian revolution in 
1979 to 2011.The result indicates that the 1% increase in real GDP decreases infla-
tion 0.67%. The negative impact of real GDP on inflation is confirmed by estimation 
although R-square is low (20%). It means that a decrease in real GDP augments in-
flation (stagflation). The result conflicts with our expectation from the Phillips curve; 
hence it shows the Iran’s inflation is also related to supply side besides demand side. 
Figure 2: Inflation and Real GDP in Iran (1979-2011/ since revolution)
Most researchers have found analytical models which include monetary and cost-
push inflation (Bahmani-Oskooee, 1995; Bonato, 2007) or monetary and structural 
inflation (Samimi & Jamshidbaygi, 2011; Tekin-Koru & Özmen, 2003) particularly 
in Iran. However it is necessary to construct models which contain the vital factors 
of all these three theories such as money supply, real GDP, oil price, exchange rate, 
budget deficit.
Furthermore, most of the models just concern about the relationship between the 
market exchange and inflation; while there is a lack of study about the impact of 
official exchange rate on inflation. For example there is the huge difference between 
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official exchange rate and market (black) exchange rate from 1977 to 2001. The dif-
ference ranged from 0 to 6879 Rials.This gap can impact inflation as well.
Apart from inflation causes, study on inflation persistence has attracted much 
attention for economists and monetary authorities in the last decade particularly in 
the USA; namely, Noriega and Ramos-Francia (2009) and Cogley, Primiceri, and 
Sargent (2010). They believe that adequate responses to inflation rely upon the degree 
of inflation persistence. Hence monetary authorities need to know the degree of infla-
tion persistence so that they can fight with inflation by applying the optimal monetary 
policy. Measuring of inflation persistence responds to these two main questions of 
the Iranian economy;(1) how far are monetary policies from their optimal degree at 
which they can control inflation?; (2) which shock has more impact on inflation; the 
permanent or temporary one?
Research Methodology 
Variables and Data
This study analyzes the reasons of inflation in Iran and has chosen the sample period 
data from 1970 to 2011. The main variables of this research are Consumer Price In-
dex (P), broad money (M2),  real gross domestic products (GDP97) (base 1997=100), 
market exchange rate (MEXRATE), official exchange rate (OEXRATE), price of oil 
(PO), and budget deficit (BD). All variables are transformed into natural logarithm 
form, except budget deficit. Budget deficit is based on the percentage of nominal 
GDP. Moreover, Data have been collected from Central Bank of Iran (CBI). 
Conceptual Frameworks
With respect to the objectives, this study has divided the causes of inflation into 
two categories including internal and external in Figure 3. Internal causes include 
money supply, real GDP, exchange rate, and budget deficit while external causes are 
oil price and economic sanctions. Moreover the impact of exchange rate on inflation 
is studied from two points of view which are market exchange rate and official ex-
change rate. The effect of economic sanctions on inflation is studied through dum-
my sanctions 
Apart from the causes of inflation, conceptual framework illustrates the impact of 
the monetary policies against inflation. Therefore, this study measures the inflation 
persistence to realize how far are monetary policies from the optimal level of being 
able to control inflation.
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Figure 3: Conceptual Framework
Analytical framework
Figure 4 illustrates the appropriate methods of analyzing each objective. First, Engle- 
Granger test and the Autoregressive Distributed Lag Modeling (ARDL) are applied 
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Granger test and the Autoregressive Distributed Lag Modeling (ARDL) are applied to 
analyze the response of inflation to its determinants in objective 1 (Obj1). 
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Figure 3: Conceptual Framework
Analytical framework
Figure 4 illustrates the appropriate methods of analyzing each objective. First, Engle- 
Granger test and the Autoregressive Distributed Lag Modeling (ARDL) are applied 
to analyze the response of inflation to its determinants in objective 1 (Obj1).
ARDL
Figure 4: Analytical Framework
Two models are applied to cover objective 1 (Obj1) with respect to inflation the-
ories such as demand-pull, cost-push, and structural inflation. We expand the previ-
ous studies of Bahmani-Oskooee (1995), Bonato (2007) and Armesh, Salarzehi, and 
Mohammad (2010) in Iran. With mixed order of integration in the variables, Engle 
and Granger (1987),Pesaran and Shin (1998), and Pesaran et al. (2001) suggest apply-
ing the multi-co-integration models including Engle-Granger Testand Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag (ARDL). 
Apart from causes of inflation, the role of monetary policies on inflation is taken 
into account in objective 2. Following Hansen (1999),Levin, Natalucci, and Piger 
(2004) and Capistrán and Ramos‐Francia (2009), we apply the Grid bootstrap Method 
(GBM), and Impulse Response Functions (IRF) to measure the inflation persistence 
(π_t). In GBM model, optimal monetary policy is a function of inflation persistence. 
The GBM estimates the β coefficient as inflation persistence in autoregressive (AR) 
model as follows.
Two models are applied to cover objective 1 (Obj1) with respect to inflation theories 
such as demand-pull, cost-push, and structural inflation. We expand the previous studies of 
Bahmani-Oskooee (1995), Bonato (2007) and Armesh, Salarzehi, and Mohammad (2010) in 
Iran. With mixed order of integration in the variables, Engle and Granger (1987),Pesaran and 
Shin (1998), and Pesaran et al. (2001) suggest applying the multi-co-integration models 
i cluding Engle-Granger Testand Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL).  
Apart from causes of inflation, the role of monetary policies on inflation is taken into 
account in objective 2. Following Hansen (1999),Levin, Natalucci, and Piger (2004) and 
Capistrán and Ramos‐Francia (2009), we apply the Grid bootstrap Method (GBM), and 
Impulse Response Functions (IRF) to measure the inflation persistence(π_t). In GBM model, 
optimal monetary policy is a function of inflation persistence. The GBM estimates the β 
coefficient as inflation persiste c  in autoregressive (AR) odel as follows. 
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The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root testis applied to determine the order of 
integration. But there is a concern which may data has structural break. It may lead to choose 
not appropriate methods to analyze the models. So, to remove this problem except ADF test, 
is applied the structural of Zivot and Andrews (2002) test to analyze the unit test with 
structural breaks.Except precondition for time series data we test residual diagnostics. The 
main diagnostic tests are the serial correlation, normality, functional form, and 
ARDL EG Test GBM 





EG Test: Engle -Granger Test 
ARDL: The Autoregressive Distributed Lag Modeling 
PCM: The Principal Component Model 
GBM: The Grid bootstrap Method 
IRFs: Impulse Response Functions 
 IRFs 
Two models are applied to cover objectiv  1 (Obj1) with respect to inflation theories 
such as demand-pull, cost-push, and structural inflation. We expand the previous studies of 
Bahmani-Oskooee (1995), Bonato (2007) and Armesh, Salarzehi, and Mohammad (2010) in 
Iran. With mixed order of integration in the variables, Engle and Granger (1987),Pesaran and 
Shin (1998), and Pesaran et al. (2001) suggest applying the multi-co-integration models 
including Engle-Granger Testand Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL).  
Apart from causes of inflation, the role of monetary policies on inflation is taken into 
account in objective 2. Following Hansen (1999),Levin, Natalucci, and Piger (2004) and 
Capistrán and Ramos‐Francia (2009), we apply the Grid bootstrap Method (GBM), and 
Impulse Response Functions (IRF) to measure the inflation persistence(π_t). In GBM model, 
optimal monetary policy is a function of inflation persistence. The GBM estimates the β 
coefficient as inflation persistence in autoregressive (AR) model as follows. 
⎩⎪
⎨
⎪⎧ 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 � ����𝜋𝜋��
𝜋𝜋� �  � �  𝛽𝛽 𝜋𝜋��� ��𝛽𝛽�
�
���
 ∆𝜋𝜋��� � ��
The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root testis applied to determine the order of 
integration. But there is a concern which may data has structural break. It may lead to choose 
not appropriate methods to analyze the models. So, to remove this problem except ADF test, 
is applied the structural of Zivot and Andrews (2002) test to analyze the unit test with 
structural breaks.Except precondition for time series data we test residual diagnostics. The 
main diagnostic tests are the serial correlation, normality, functional form, and 
ARDL EG Test GBM 





EG Test: Engle -Granger Test 
ARDL: The Autoregressive Distributed Lag Modeling 
PCM: The Principal Component Model 
GBM: The Grid bootstrap Method 
IRFs: Impulse Response Functions 
 IRFs 
8 Hamidreza Ghorbani Dastgerdi
The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root testis applied to determine the 
order of integration. But there is a concern which may data has structural break. It 
may lead to choose not appropriate methods to analyze the models. So, to remove 
this problem except ADF test, is applied the structural of Zivot and Andrews (2002) 
test to analyze the unit test with structural breaks.Except precondition for time series 
data we test residual diagnostics. The main diagnostic tests are the serial correlation, 
normality, functional form, and heteroscedasticity. Furthermore, to choose the opti-
mal lag it concerns the Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) test.
Findings and Discussion 
Unit Root Tests
The ADF unit root test is performed on the level series with a constant, and a constant 
with a time trend.Only a constant term is included in the unit root test with first dif-
ference. The number of lags of the dependent variable in the ADF test is chosen based 
on the AIC. Table 1 illustrates the null hypothesis of unit root in all the level series 
cannot be rejected by the ADF statistics as the values are not large enough. Using 
an intercept and lagged on first-difference of dependent variable, the first difference 
ADF statistics are calculated. When first-differenced data are applied, the existence 
of unit root is rejected for all the variables. The ADF statistics, τ_μ on all the series 
are very high statistically significant at 1%and 5% level. 
Table 1: Unit Root Tests (1970-2011)
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test
H0: Unit Root
Zivot-Andrews test
H0: Unit Root and Structural Break
Series Level Difference Level








P 2 0.13 1 -2.33 0 -4.06*** 1 -4.57 1994 1 -5.02 1994
M2 1 -0.85 1 -2.74 0 -3.31** 3 -5.89*** 1984 3 -5.22** 2000
GDP97 4 1.15 5 -0.96 5 -3.38** 1 -4.02 1980 1 -4.84** 1986
MEXRATE 2 -1.17 1 -1.86 1 -3.61** 3 -3.21 2005 3 -4.73 1994
OEXRATE 0 -0.29 0 -2.38 0 -6.19*** 0 -6.37*** 1992 0 -9.37*** 1992
PO 0 -2.46 0 -2.50 0 -5.98*** 0 -3.55 1986 0 -2.81 2005
BD 0 -2.69 0 -2.87 0 -8.23*** 0 -4.91 1989 0 -4.91 1989
Notes: 1. P, M2, GDP97, MEXRATE, OEXRATE, PO, and BD are the consumer price index, real gross domestic 
product, the exchange rate,  the official exchange rate , the gap between official and market exchange rate, the price 
of oil and budget deficit, respectively.
2. ***and ** represent significant level at 1% and 5%, respectively.
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3. The Augmented Dickey Fuller test statistics are computed with an intercept, a liner time trend and k lagged 
first-difference of the series to the series in level. The ADF regression in first-differences, exclude a liner time trend. 
The lag length (k) was selected based on Akaike Information Criteria (AIC). Atn=50, the ADF critical values are 
-3.58 (1%), -2.93 (5%) and -2.60 (10%) for constant (); -4.15 (1%), -3.50 (5%) and -3.18 (10%) for a constant and 
time trend ().
4. The ZA tests are based on the null hypothesis of unit root. The optimal lag length (k) is selected based upon the 
t-significance approach as suggested by  Ng and Perron (1995). The ZA critical values are -3.34 (1%), -4.80 (5%) 
and -4.58 (10%) for a constant (); -5.57(1%), -5.08 (5%) and -4.82 (10%) for a constant and time trend ().
The ADF unit root test displays low power when a series is confronted with struc-
tural break. To circumvent this problem, Zivot-Andrews’ (ZA) unit root test is uti-
lized here. The results of ZA test for all variables in the level with a constant (ϑ_μ) 
and a constant and trend (ϑ_τ). Interestingly, the results suggest that there is a unit 
root in P, MEXRATE, PO, and BD series despite provisions for possible structural 
breaks. However, the test is unable to detect the presence of unit root in M2, OEX-
RATE and GDP97. In other words, the null hypothesis of unit root is rejected for M2, 
OEXRATE and GDP97 at 5% significance level. Hence, P, MEXRATE, PO, and BD 
areI(1) and M2, OEXRATE and GDP97 are I(0). In the case of broad money (M2), 
it is noted that the break dates occurred at 1984 and 2000. While, the break dates 
occurred at 1992 for OEXRATE and for GDP97 at 1986. The ZA unit root test proves 
that some of the variables are stationary in the level form with structural breaks. 
Cointegration Analysis: Engle–Granger (EG) Test 
We already apply the ADF and ZA unit root tests. All we should estimate the regres-
sions such as equation 1 and 2,find the residuals, and use the ADF test.
P = -6.6+ 0.68 M2 + 0.18 GDP97 + 0.20 MEXRATE - 0.32 PO + 0.004 BD            (1)
t = (-2.53)    (7.81)        (0.79)             (2.46)               (-9.04)      (0.7)
R-squared = 0.99     DW=1.34                                                                                  (1.A)
ΔUt = -0.003 - 0.71Ut-1
t =       (-0.29)    (-4.84)       
R-squared = 0.34     DW = 1.95
P = 0.61 + 0.87 M2 - 0.45 GDP97 + 0.042 OEXRATE - 0.34 PO + 0.01 BD          (2)
t = (0.47)    (44.09)        (-3.9)             (1.91)               (-10.44)      (3.24)
R-squared = 0.99     DW=1.34
ΔUt = -0.001 - 0.73Ut-1                                                                   (2.A)
t =         (-0.14)    (-4.79)       
R-squared = 0.37     DW = 1.95
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Equation 1 and equation 2 illustrate the most important variables to increase infla-
tion are money supply (M2) and market exchange rate.  Budget deficit also increases 
inflation. While price of oil and real GDP decrease it.  Market exchange rate rises in-
flation 4.7 times bigger than official exchange rate (0.20/0.042=4.76). It means infla-
tion decreases when the monetary authorities apply the official exchange rate instead 
of market exchange rate.
As we have realized some variables such as P and GDP97 are non-stationary in 
the level (see table 1); these regressions are possibly spurious. Granger notes, “A test 
for co-integration can be thought of as a pre-test to avoid ‘spurious regression’ situa-
tions”. But when we make a unit root test on the residuals obtained from equation 1 
and equation 2. The Engle–Granger 1 percent critical value is -4.85 in question 1.A 
and -4.79 in equation 2.A.As the computed values are much more negative than this, 
our conclusion is that the residuals from the regression are I(0); that is, they are sta-
tionary. Hence, question 1 and 2 are   co-integrating regressions and these regressions 
are not spurious, while some variables are individually non-stationary. Equation 1 
and 2 are as the long-run inflation functions. They explain its parameters such as 
long-run parameters. 
Cointegration Analysis: ARDL Bound Test 
Table 2 demonstrates the ARDL bound test for cointegration analysis. Both models 
include broad money (M2), real GDP (GDP97), price of oil (PO) and budget deficit 
(BD) as the independent variables that explain the behavior of the consumer price 
index (P) in the models. Apart from the listed variables, models 1 includes the market 
exchange rate while model 2 the official exchange rate. A dummy sanction is added 
in both models as an external factor of inflation.
Table 2: Bounds Test: Long-run Relationship Analysis (1970-2011)
Period: 1970- 2011 Computed F-statistic
Bound Critical 
Values




Model 1:F(P|M2,GDP97,MEXRATE,PO,BD,DSAN) 5.31*** [2.82  4.21] 1.94(0.37)
Model 2:F(P|M2,GDP97,OEXRATE,PO,BD,DSAN) 3.48** [2.14  3.34] 3.95(0.13)
Note: 1. .P, M2, GDP97, MEXRATE, OEXRATE,PO, BD, DREV and DSAN  are the consumer price index, broad 
money, real GDP, the market exchange rate, the official exchange rate, price of oil, budget deficit, and a dummy for 
sanction. 
2. The number of independent variables is 5 for all the models, k=5. The selected lag is 2 for all the models based 
on AIC selection and diagnostic tests especially Lagrange multiplier (LM) statistic for testing the hypothesis of 
no residual serial correlation. Asymptotic critical value bounds test is based on the assumption that the variables 
are I(0) and I(1)  Pesaran et al. (2001); The asterisks   ***, **, and * denote significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively.
3. AR is Breusch-Godfrey serial correlation test.
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Table 2 shows the computed F-statistic for the two models with the critical bound 
values1. The computed F-statistic are 5.31, 3.48 which are bigger than the upper criti-
cal bounds value, 4.21, 3.34, respectively. Comparison between the computed F-sta-
tistic and the critical upper value for each model suggests that there is a long-run 
co-integration vector for each model. 
Long-run and Short-run Dynamic Analysis
Table 3 provides findings on the long-run and short-run relationship between infla-
tion and factors that affect inflation in Iran based on the ARDL estimation. Refer-
ring to two models, a 1% increase in broad money causes an increase of 0.93% and 
0.85%, in inflation in the long run, respectively. In other words, on average a 1% 
increase in broad money will increase inflation about 0.89% in the long run. Thus, 
all the models prove broad money is one of the main causes of inflation in Iran. The 
increase of broad money has a direct effect on the demand side. It shifts the demand 
curve to the right. If supply side fails to accommodate this extra demand, pressure 
will be built up on prices and the economy will face inflation. With the existence 
of supply constraint in the Iranian economy the increase in broad money increases 
inflation considerably. 
From the long-run relationship analysis, the minimum and maximum values of 
budget deficit among the models are between 0.014 and 0.017. This justifies that 
another main cause of inflation is budget deficit. The budget deficits increase the 
government’s debts and to solve this, the government resorts to quantitative easing 
method. This approach only increases demand side while supply side still unable 
to accommodate with the extra demand of goods and services. Hence, inflation 
increases.  
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Note 1.P, M2, GDP97, MEXRATE, OEXRATE, ,PO, BD and DSAN are the consumer price index, broad money, 
real GDP, the market exchange rate, the official exchange rate, price of oil, budget deficit, and a dummy sanction.  
2. Wald tests have confirmed there are the long run relationships between inflation and its determinants in the two 
models in 1970-2011 yearly. Maximum of 2 lags is used for the models with respect to AIC tests and the results of 
diagnostic tests.
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3. Figures in parentheses are t-values; the asterisks   ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively.
4. There are SC=serial correlation, FF=function form,N=normality and H=heteroscedasticity;
The effect of market exchange rate on inflation is not evident in the long-run 
relationship. Because t-statistic is -0.34 and value is very much lower than the con-
ventional significance level of 0.01. Therefore, we utilize the official exchange rate 
(OEXRATE) instead of the market exchange rate (MEXRATE) in Model 2. Interest-
ingly by replacing the market exchange rate with the official exchange rate, models 
2 illustrates positive effect of the official exchange rate on inflation in the long run. 
A 1% increase in the official exchange rate causes an increase of 0.04% in inflation. 
On the contrast, the effect of oil price shocks on inflation is negative in both mod-
els. A 1% increase in the price of oil reduces inflation by 0.43% and 0.36% respec-
tively. The negative effect of oil price shocks on inflation is the result of government 
subsidy on oil. Iran is the second largest oil exporting country after Saudi Arabia in 
the OPEC. Large revenues from oil income enable the government to have subsidy 
program. Thus, generally oil prices are stable in Iran because of subsidy. Increases of 
oil prices do not have much inflationary pressure in Iran instead prices fall.
Unlike other studies, real GDP has a similar effect as oil prices. Inflation decreas-
es with a rise in real GDP in both models. Interestingly, when economic sanctions are 
considered in the models, inflation is also responding positively to economic sanc-
tions.  From Model 2, evidence from the long-run relationship shows that inflation 
increases by 0.17% when economic sanctions are present. 
The findings on the short-run relationship between inflation and its determinants 
are given in Table 3. Generally, broad money, real GDP, oil price and inflation have 
the expected sign in both models. On average, a 1% increase in broad money increas-
es inflation by 0.41% in all the models.  The effect is more than half of its effect in 
the long-run relationship (0.89%). 
The negative impact of real GDP on inflation in the short run is almost half 
(0.175%) than its effect in the long run (0.38%) in models. An increase of 1% oil 
price decreases inflation on average by 0.07% in the short run. Budget deficit and 
the market exchange rate have very small t-values therefore their impact on inflation 
is not significant in the short run. While a 1% increases of the official exchange rate 
decreases inflation by 0.029% with a one year delay in short run. Basically the offi-
cial exchange rate is operating like the fixed exchange rate system. Interestingly, the 
findings offer more evidence on the response of inflation to official exchange rate. Be-
cause it reduces inflation in short run and increases inflation in long run. It was hap-
pened because official exchange rate has increased from 1992 to 1994 and from 2002 
to 2011 considerably. Economic sanctions (DSAN) have positive effect on inflation. 
The effect is almost half (0.08) in the short run compared to the long-run estimates 
(0.17).  This shows that the sanction takes longer time to have its effect on inflation. 
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More informatioǹ  on the short-run dynamics can be explained from the speed of 
adjustment to the equilibrium in the system and this is measured by the value of the 
magnitude of ECT.  The ECT coefficient is highly statistically significant at 1% level 
in all the models and it has the right sign. The value ranges are between 0.41 and 0.51; 
this explains that on average inflation adjusts by almost 45.5% at 1% significant level 
to close the gap in bringing back the economy to equilibrium. The convergence to the 
equilibrium is moderate and not rapid.
Several measures of diagnostic tests are applied to check whether the estimations 
of the constructed models have the desirable statistical properties. The heteroskedas-
ticity test reveals that the errors are homoskedastic and is independent of regressors. 
The Breusch-Godfrey test shows that there is no significant serial correlation in the 
disturbance of the error terms. Jarque-Bera statistic shows the residuals are well be-
haved, the disturbances are normally distributed. 
Inflation Persistence 
Figure 5 shows the inflation rates from 1970 to 2011. The maximum and minimum 
of inflation are 49.46 and 4.76. While the mean and standard deviation of inflation 
is 17.46 and 8.87. This study utilizes two approaches, namely grid bootstrap method 
and impulse response functions to measure inflation persistence.
Figure 5: Inflation1970-2011
Table 4 demonstrates the result of inflation persistence by the grid bootstrap method. 
The optimal lag is one based on AIC test and diagnostic tests especially the residual serial 
correlation LM test 2 . The inflation persistence value is 0.46 at 90% grid–t confidence 
interval. `According to Grelach and Tillmann (2012), if the absolute value of 𝛽𝛽 is smaller 
than unity, |𝛽𝛽| < 1, it means that the procedure is stationary and there exists at least some 
effective monetary policy for controlling inflation. Moreover, β� = �T−1�σρ
2
�T−1�σρ2+σϑ2
=  46100 in 
which σ�� is the variance of the temporary inflation shock and 𝜎𝜎��  is the permanent shock. It 
shows that permanent shocks are smaller than temporary shocks. Based on the argument, the 
effects of monetary policy on stabilizing Iran’s inflation are somewhat effective. 
Table 4: Inflation Persistence in Iran (1970-2011) 
Sample Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Lag 𝛽𝛽� 90%Grid–t 
1970-2011 17.46 8.67 1 0.46 [0.30  0.88]
Notes: The table reports Hansen’s (1999) mean unbiased estimator of the sum of autoregressive coefficients,  
 𝛽𝛽�  and the bootstrapped 90 % confidence bands based on 200 grid points and 3000 replications conditional on breaks in the intercept 
term. The lag order is chosen according to the AIC and residual serial correlation. 
The confidence interval shows that β is within 0.30 and 0.88 at 90% grid–t confidence 
interval. The estimate (0.46) suggests that the influence of monetary policy controlling 
inflation is far from its optimal level. When β=0, monetary authorities have implemented 
optimal monetary policy and the permanent shocks are fully control by the monetary policy. 
Finally, Figure 6 illustrates the construction of the percentile–t and grid confidence 
intervals. The solid down-ward sloping line is the t-statistic function. The dashed lines are 5% 
and 95% bootstrap quantile functions, which are clearly quite nonlinear in β. The open circles 
denote the intersection points, and the black arrows indicate the endpoints of the grid-t 
interval. The percentile-t intervals can be read using the dotted lines, which show how the 
percentile-approximates the bootstrap quantile functions by flat lines at the OLS estimateβ ̂. 
The open arrows denote the percentile-t end points. From the OLS estimate β ̂= 0.46, the 
dotted lines move vertically to the 5% and 95%  bootstrap quantile functions, with the 
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Table 4 demonstrates the result of inflation persistence by the grid bootstrap meth-
od. The optimal lag is one based on AIC test and diagnostic tests especially the resid-
ual serial correlation LM test2. The inflation persistence value is 0.46 at 90% grid–t 
confidence interval. Àccording to Grelach and Tillmann (2012), if the absolute value 
of β is smaller than unity, |β| < 1, it means that the procedure is stationary and there 
exists at least some effective monetary policy for controlling inflation. Moreover, 
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The optimal lag is one based on AIC test and diagnostic tests especially the residual serial 
correlation LM test 2 . The inflation persistence value is 0.46 at 90% grid–t confidence 
interval. `According to Grelach and Tillmann (2012), if the absolute value of 𝛽𝛽 is smaller 
than unity, |𝛽𝛽| < 1, it means that the procedure is stationary and there exists at least some 
effective monetary policy for controlling inflation. Moreover, β� = �T−1�σρ
2
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=  46100 in 
which σ�� is the variance of the temporary inflation shock and 𝜎𝜎��  is the permanent shock. It 
shows that permanent shocks are smaller than temporary shocks. Based on the argument, the 
effects of monetary policy on stabilizing Iran’s inflation are somewhat effective. 
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Notes: The table reports Hansen’s (1999) mean unbiased estimator of the sum of autoregressive coefficients,  
 𝛽𝛽�  and the bootstrapped 90 % confidence bands based on 200 grid points and 3000 replications conditional on breaks in the intercept 
term. The lag order is chosen according to the AIC and residual serial correlation. 
The confidence interval shows that β is within 0.30 and 0.88 at 90% grid–t confidence 
interval. The estimate (0.46) suggests that the influence of monetary policy controlling 
inflation is far from its optimal level. When β=0, monetary authorities have implemented 
optimal monetary policy and the permanent shocks are fully control by the monetary policy. 
Finally, Figure 6 illustrates the construction of the percentile–t and grid confidence 
intervals. The solid down-ward sloping line is the t-statistic function. The dashed lines are 5% 
and 95% bootstrap quantile functions, which are clearly quite nonlinear in β. The open circles 
denote the intersection points, and the black arrows indicate the endpoints of the grid-t 
interval. The percentile-t intervals can be read using the dotted lines, which show how the 
percentile-approximates the bootstrap quantile functions by flat lines at the OLS estimateβ ̂. 
The open arrows denote the percentile-t end points. From the OLS estimate β ̂= 0.46, the 
dotted lines move vertically to the 5% and 95%  bootstrap quantile functions, with the 
  i  which σ2ϑ is the variance of the temporary inflation 
shock and σ2ρ is the permanent shock. It shows that permanent shocks are smaller 
th n temporary shocks. Based on the argument, the effects of monetary policy on 
stabilizing Iran’s inflation are somewhat effective.
Table 4: Inflation Persistence in Iran (1970-2011)
Sample Mean Standard Deviation Lag β̂ 90%Grid–t
1970-2011 17.46 8.67 1 0.46 [0.30  0.88]
Notes: The table reports Hansen’s (1999) mean unbiased estimator of the sum of autoregressive coefficients, 
β̂ and the bootstrapped 90 % confidence bands based on 200 grid points and 3000 replications conditional on breaks 
in the ntercept term. The lag ord  is chosen according to the AIC and residual serial correlation.
The confidence interval shows that β is within 0.30 and 0.88 at 90% grid–t con-
fidence interval. The estimate (0.46) suggests that the influence of monetary policy 
controlling inflation is far from its optimal level. When β=0, monetary authorities 
have implemented opti al monetary policy and the permanent shocks are fully con-
trol by the mo licy.
Finally, Figure 6 illustrates the construction of the percentile–t and grid con-
fidence intervals. The solid down-ward sloping line is the t-statistic function. The 
dashed lines are 5% and 9  bootstrap quantile functions, which are clearly quite 
nonlinear in β. The open circles denote the intersection points, and the black arrows 
indicate the endpoints of the grid-t interval. The percentile-t intervals can be read 
using the dotted lines, which show how the percentile-approximates the bootstrap 
quantile functions by flat lines at the OLS estimate β̂. The open arrows denote the 
percentile-t end points. From the OLS estimate β̂ = 0.46, the dotted lines move verti-
cally to the 5% and 95%  bootstrap quantile functions, with the intersections marked 
by the open diamonds. From these points, the dotted lines move horizontally to the 
t-statistic functiont (β). The points of intersection, marked by open rectangles, are the 
percentile-t bootstrap endpoints. These are projected onto the x axis and marked by 
the white arrowheads. This 90% percentile-t bootstrap interval is [0.30  0.88].
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Figure 6:  90%- Confidence Interval for  (Inflation)
Note: The dashed lines are the 5% and 95% bootstrap quantile functions. The solid line is the t-statistic function.,The 
intersections mark the endpoints of the grid-t confidence interval. The linear projections mark the endpoints of the 
percentile-t interval.
Second approach to measure inflation persistence is impulse response functions 
(IRF). Figure 7 and Table 6 show nearly 53% of inflation to one standard error shock 
to inflation decreases after a year. Similarly, the effect of a one-unit shock of inflation 
to inflation reduces almost 52% in each year and reaches to zero after 10 years. In-
terestingly the coefficient of GBM, , and the average amount of inflation dropped in 
each period in IRFs, 0.52,state the same judgment about inflation persistence.
intersections marked by the open diamonds. From these points, the dotted lines move 
horizontally to the t-statistic functiont(β). The points of intersection, marked by open 
rectangles, are the percentile-t bootstrap endpoints. These are projected onto the x axis and 
marked by the white arrowheads. This 90% percentile-t bootstrap interval is [0.30  0.88]. 
Note: The dashed lines are the 5  and 95  bootstrap quantile functions. The solid line is the t-statistic function.,The intersections mark the 
endpoints of the grid-t confidence interval. The linear projections mark the endp ints of the percentile-t interval. 
Second approach to measure inflation persistence is impulse response functions (IRF). 
Figure 7 and Table 6 show nearly 53% of inflation to one standard error shock to inflation 
decreases after a year. Similarly, the effect of a one-unit shock of inflation to inflation 
reduces almost 52% in each year and reaches to zero after 10 years. Interestingly the 
coefficient of GBM,= 0.46  , and the average amount of inflation dropped in each period in 
IRFs, 0.52,state the same judgment about inflation persistence. 
In other words, the results of these two methods show inflation persistent is not the 
unit root because the estimated 𝛽𝛽 and the confidence interval do not include the unity. Hence 
 Period 
 1  7.633520 
 2  3.635291 
 3  1.731225 
 4  0.824457 
 5  0.392629 
 6  0.186981 
 7  0.089045 
 8  0.042406 
 9  0.020195 
 10  0.009617 
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Figure 7 and Table 6 :Response of Inflation to Inflation Innovation
In other words, the results of these two methods show inflation persistent is not the 
unit root because the estimated  and the confidence interval do not include the uni-
ty. Hence inflation persistence follows the structural changes and finally permanent 
shocks die out after some horizons. It shows monetary authorities are trying to con-
trol inflation by monetary policy but their monetary policies are yet far from optimal 
level. Low inflation persistence helps to maintain low inflation because shocks that 
trigger inflation now would have a less prolonged influence on the rate of inflation in 
the following period (Zhang & Clovis, 2009). 
Conclusion 
This study suggests that controlling money supply is the key factor to control infla-
tion in Iran. Although to some extent monetary policy remained effective in attaining 
inflation targets, it was incapacitated to manage inflation to single-digit level. There-
fore, monetary policy has remained inadequate to subdue inflation and other mone-
tary targets set in the Development Plans in Iran. The challenge is how to control the 
money supply effectively. 
The appreciation of Rial exchange rate is an important factor of lower inflation. 
The results advocate that the fixed exchange rate is an appropriate exchange rate 
regime to control inflation. There exists a direct relationship between budget deficits 
and inflation and sources of government income are such as oil revenues and income 
taxes.  The Kuwait’s experience can be used along with the tax reforms to finance 
budget deficit of the Iranian government.  Mehrara (2007) study shows an interesting 
experience of Kuwait budget deficit. The country has successfully stabilized its infla-
tion and formed saving fund called the General Reserve Fund (GRF) as a measure of 
self-insurance to deal with volatile revenues.
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reduces almost 52% in each year and reaches to zero after 10 years. Interestingly the 
coefficient of GBM,= 0.46  , and the average amount of inflation dropped in each period in 
IRFs, 0.52,state the same judgment about inflation persistence. 
In other words, the results of these two methods show inflation persistent is not the 
unit root because the estimated 𝛽𝛽 and the confidence interval do not include the unity. Hence 
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Inflation persistence follows the structural changes and finally permanent 
shocks die out after some horizons. It shows monetary authorities are trying to 
control inflation by monetary policy but their monetary policies are yet far from 
optimal level.
NOTES
1 The critical bound values are given by Pesaran et al. (2001). Follow Pesaran and Shin (1998), the 
selected optimal lag for each model is two based on AIC selection and diagnostic tests. The results of 
AR show that all the models have no serial correlations and therefore Wald test (F test) is applied on 
each model.
2 AIC value for lag one is 6.94  and it is the smallest value among others.  Serial Correlation: =0.28(0.59).
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